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Abstract 
The use of public procurement to promote private innovation activities has 
attracted increasing attention recently. Germany implemented a legal change in 
its procurement framework in 2009, which allowed government agencies to 
specify innovative aspects of procured products as selection criteria in tender 
calls. We analyze a representative sample of German firms to investigate 
whether this reform stimulated innovation in the business sector. Across a wide 
set of specifications—OLS, nearest-neighbor matching, IV regressions and 
difference-in-differences—we find a robust and significant effect of innovation-
directed public procurement on turnover from new products and services. 
However, our results show that the effect is largely attributable to innovations 
of more incremental nature rather than market novelties. 
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1 Introduction 
Governments sponsor private research and development (R&D) activities in a number of 
ways and theoretical justifications for these public interventions are well understood in the 
literature (Arrow, 1962; Hall and Lerner, 2010). In addition to a functioning system of 
intellectual property protection, R&D tax credits (Dechezleprêtre, Einiö, Martin, Nguyen, Van 
Reenen, 2016) and direct subsidies for private R&D projects (Einiö, 2014; Howell, 2017) are 
the most important policy instruments at the disposal of governments to date. In recent years, 
however, demand-side alternatives such as public procurement of innovation have attracted 
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increasing attention by policy makers and academics alike (EFI 2013; OECD, 2017; 
Slavtchev and Wiederhold, 2016). 
Governments spend large budgets in various product categories in order to provide their 
services to citizens. If a share of this public spending could be redirected towards more 
innovative products and services instead of already established alternatives, so the idea goes, 
the demand for innovative solutions in the economy would increase significantly (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2017). At the same time, private firms would have larger incentives to invest in 
R&D, especially in sectors where there is insufficient private demand (e.g, in green energy or 
transportation). The idea is particularly appealing to policy makers in times of continued 
budgetary pressure, as the additional demand for innovation and resulting incentives for R&D 
investment might be created with little to no extra money (OECD, 2016).1 
In the past, however, the way in which public procurement contracts were awarded 
constituted a major obstacle for implementation. Procurement agencies tried to define as 
precisely as possible the products and services they were willing to buy in a call for tenders. 
At the same time, legal frameworks did not offer the possibility to explicitly specify 
innovative aspects or more broadly defined performance characteristics as selection criteria in 
tender calls. In other words, standard procurement tenders did not allow to describe products 
or services that were not yet invented or developed. Recognizing this problem, the European 
Union (EU) passed revised public procurement directives in 2014 that aimed at facilitating the 
procurement of innovations. Under the new regulatory framework, innovative solutions and 
yet to be developed technologies can be an explicit part of the contractual arrangements of the 
procurement process (Public Procurement with Contracted Innovation, PPCI). This is 
                                                 
1 A closely related variant to public procurement of innovation is pre-commercial procurement (PCP), 
which refers to the direct purchase of R&D services by government agencies. PCP does not involve the 
transaction of a marketable product but instead is a form of contract research. Therefore, authors in the literature 
tend to characterize it as a supply-side measure (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). In the following we 
will focus our attention on public procurement of innovation as a demand-side instrument but will discuss the 
possibility of a combined use with PCP in Section 5. 
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permitted as long as the transparency of the process is guaranteed and fair rules of 
competition are not affected. The new directives favor functional specifications in tender 
calls, which reduce the risk of overly rigid tenders and provide more flexibility to suppliers to 
come up with innovative ways of meeting public needs. Furthermore, the revised framework 
encourages procurers to take life-cycle cost considerations into account rather than deciding 
solely on the basis of initial purchasing costs.  
In this paper we exploit the fact that Germany was a forerunner in this policy 
development and adopted similar regulations already in 2009. Thus, although reforms were 
only recently adopted at the European level and data for evaluation still need to accumulate, 
we are able to infer the effectiveness of PPCI as a policy instrument for innovation from the 
German experience. To this end we analyze a sample of 3410 firms from the German part of 
the EU’s Community Innovation Survey in the period of 2010 to 2012.2 As a baseline we start 
with cross-sectional results from OLS regressions. To relax parametric assumptions, we also 
present nearest-neighbor matching results. Subsequently, in order to rule out endogeneity 
concerns as much as our data permit, we estimate IV regressions based on a procedure 
suggested by Lewbel (2012), which allows identification based on higher moments without 
the need for outside instruments. Eventually, augmenting our data with additional information 
from the Tender Electronics Daily (TED) database, provided by the European Commission, 
puts us into the position to employ panel fixed-effects models (i.e., generalized difference-in-
differences). We find a positive and statistically significant effect of PPCI on firms’ share of 
turnover from selling new products and services that is robust across all specifications. The 
marginal effect amounts to 8.7 percentage points according to our OLS baseline and remains 
at comparable levels in the other models too. Based on these estimates we calculate that PPCI 
                                                 
2 Our data is at the firm-level. We have no information on other participants (and their bidding behavior) 
in procurement auctions that involve innovative products or services. Therefore, we do not contribute to a stream 
of literature that investigates optimal auction design (see for example, Lewis and Bajari, 2011; Decarolis, 2014; 
and Hyytinen, Lundberg and Toivanen, 2017). We regard the collection of more detailed data on innovation-
related public procurement auctions as a fruitful avenue for future research. 
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increased turnover with new products and services in the German business sector in 2012 by 
EUR 13 billion, which represents 0.37% of GDP. However, our results reveal that the effect is 
primarily driven by increased turnover with products and services that are new to the firm, 
while we find the effect on market novelties to be insignificant. 
Our paper is not the first to investigate the effectiveness of demand-side innovation 
policies empirically (see Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016, for a detailed review). A seminal 
study by Lichtenberg (1988) establishes a positive relationship between competitively 
awarded procurement contracts3 and company-sponsored R&D in a panel of 169 US firms in 
the period between 1979 and 1984. Draca (2013) finds a positive effect of defense-related 
procurement on firm’s patenting activities and R&D expenditures in the US. In a sample of 
1149 German firms between 2000 and 2002, Aschoff and Sofka (2009) document higher 
shares of turnover from market novelties in firms that introduced significantly improved 
products or processes due to demand from public authorities. Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) 
investigate both supply-side and demand-side technology policies and find a robust positive 
impact of the latter on innovation spending in a sample of firms from 27 EU member states. 
Most recently, Slavtchev and Wiederhold (2016) show that public purchases of high-tech 
products can positively affect private R&D employment at the state-level in the US. None of 
these studies, however, consider whether public procurement frameworks actually permit to 
specify innovation-related components in tenders, which we regard as a necessary condition 
to develop the full potential of this policy instrument. Furthermore, we contribute to the 
literature by investigating the differential effect of public procurement on firms’ success with 
radical versus more incremental innovations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the potential for 
public procurement as an innovation policy instrument and outlines recent changes of 
                                                 
3 In his analysis Lichtenberg differentiates between competitive public procurement contracts, which are 
auctioned off by a federal agency, and “follow-on” contracts that are awarded to once successful bidders on a 
non-competitive basis. He finds a positive impact on private R&D investment only for the former type.  
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procurement frameworks in the EU. Section 3 describes our data and econometric approaches. 
Empirical results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses the theoretical and 
policy implications of our study and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Conceptual background 
2.1 Potential of public procurement as policy instrument for innovation 
The idea behind public procurement of innovation as a policy instrument can be motivated by 
the sheer size of government demand. In 2013, public procurement represented on average 
12% of GDP and 29% of total government expenditures in OECD countries (Appelt and 
Galindo-Rueda, 2016). For Germany, in a study prepared on behalf of the federal government, 
the Wegweiser GmbH (2009) reports that public procurement volumes have been exceeding 
EUR 200 billion since the early 2000s. In 2006, the public procurement volume has reached 
almost EUR 250 billion. It is instructive to compare this volume with current levels of public 
R&D funding. In 2009 (2013), total R&D spending in Germany amounted to EUR 67 (80) 
billion according to the Federal Ministry for Education and Research.4 These totals are split 
into shares expensed by the business sector, the federal government and the state governments 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: R&D spending in Germany 2009 and 2013 
  2009 2013 
Total R&D spending (billion EUR) 67 80 
Business sector 42 54 
Federal government  12 16 
State governments 10 10 
 
Roughly two thirds of total R&D spending occur in the business sector. The one third 
coming from the public sector can be further split into direct and indirect R&D grants, which 
                                                 
4 These and the following numbers have been obtained from multiple editions of the report 
“Bundesbericht Forschung” published by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. 
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are used to subsidize R&D projects in both firms and public research institutions, and into 
institutional funding for public research institutions as well as “other” types. Institutional and 
other funding amount to EUR 6.4 billion and R&D grants to EUR 5.6 billion in 2009. The 
latter amount can be further broken down according to the type of recipients, i.e. public 
research organizations and the business sector. In 2009, EUR 2.3 billion arrived in the 
business sector in form of direct and indirect R&D subsidies.  
We can thus conclude that the overall public procurement volume of EUR 250 billion in 
2006 was about one hundred times higher than the amount paid as R&D subsidies to the 
business sector in 2009. The factor hundred thereby illustrates the massive potential of public 
procurement to stimulate demand in policy-relevant product categories such as innovation and 
technology. Obviously, the lion’s share of public procurement does not offer any possibilities 
for stimulating innovation as many procurement contracts will involve the purchase of 
standardized goods and services for everyday business. In order to estimate the innovation 
potential of public procurement, Wegweiser GmbH (2009) mapped procurement contracts 
into product categories. Based on a classification of “high-tech” products, the authors 
estimated that a share of about 10% of total public procurement, or EUR 25 billion, could 
potentially be used to stimulate innovation. This implies that the quantitative potential of 
public procurement of innovation is about ten times larger than the amount of public R&D 
subsidies distributed to the business sector. 
2.2 Revision of public procurement law in the EU 
In the EU, the potential of using demand-side innovation policies in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of European industries, improve the provision of public services, and tackle 
grand societal challenges has been long recognized (European Commission, 2003). 
Commitment 17 of the EU’s Innovation Union Flagship Initiative was concerned with 
improving the well-functioning of public procurement markets for innovation across Europe 
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(European Commission, 2015). In particular, the initiative aimed at overcoming the 
fragmentation of procurement activities by harmonizing framework conditions that allow for 
cross-border tenders. Moreover, the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
should be promoted and specific public procurement budgets were set aside in the EU’S 
Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation (Horizon 2020).5 
Most importantly, however, the European Commission proposed the revised public 
procurement directives 2014/24/EU6 and 2014/25/EU7, which were adopted by the European 
Parliament and Council in 2014 and had to be translated into national laws by 2016 (European 
Commission, 2015).8 Within the new legal framework public procurers are explicitly 
encouraged to prepare calls for tenders that include functional and performance-based 
specifications in order to promote innovation (2014/24/EU, par. 74). Furthermore, the 
possibility to consider innovative aspects and life-cycle costs of proposed solutions has been 
put on a proper legal basis. Appropriate award criteria are supposed to guarantee that 
innovative products and services have a better chance of getting selected in procurement 
auctions. The adoption of these rules constituted a major milestone in removing obstacles for 
the use of public procurement as an effective policy tool for innovation. 
Procurement procedures adhere to the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, 
and cost-effectiveness (Valovirta, 2015; Vonortas, 2015). In practice, however, this meant 
that public agencies issued calls for tenders that were very narrowly specified in order to 
guarantee said transparency in the award process. Moreover, cost-effectiveness was often 
                                                 
5 See: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/ (accessed 30 November 2017). 
6 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN 
(accessed 30 November 2017). 
7 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0025&from=EN 
(accessed 30 November 2017). 
8 Interestingly, a majority of EU Member States missed the deadline of April 2016 for implementation of 
directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. As a consequence, the European Commission launched formal 
infringement procedures against the delinquent countries. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1846_en.htm (accessed 30 November 2017). 
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defined solely on the basis of initial costs at the time of purchase; i.e., the lowest bid won in a 
procurement auction (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). 
Compared to overly narrow descriptions of requested products and services, functional 
specifications allow suppliers to come up with innovative solutions that are best suited for 
solving a given problem at hand (Aschoff and Sofka, 2009; Edquist, Vonortas, and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia, 2015). Likewise, because firms need to recoup their R&D costs, innovative 
products are often initially more expensive than conventional alternatives (Edquist and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). Thus, broader definitions of cost-effectiveness, i.e., taking into 
account life-cycle costs, in which innovative products prove to be superior, are necessary in 
order to make them competitive in bidding rounds (European Commission, 2015). Specifying 
broader performance-related award criteria and requiring innovations as integral components 
of public procurement tenders additionally reduces the investment risk for suppliers 
associated with the development of innovative products and services (van Meerveld, Nauta, 
and Whyles, 2015).  
Table 2: Examples for public procurement calls for tenders  
Example 1: traditional specification 
“The government agency invites tenders for the delivery and installation of 280 street 
lights; each equipped with 70 watts sodium vapor lamps.” 
 
Example 2: functional specification, including innovative aspects 
“The government agency seeks to illuminate 18 residential streets with an illumination 
level of three lux over a period of 11.2 hours (on average) per day. The light sources need 
to have a minimum life expectancy of 100,000 service hours and their energy consumption 
should be 85% percent below the currently employed system.” 
 
Notes: examples adapted from Eßig, Schaupp, Jungclaus, and Kurz (2014) 
 
Table 2 contrasts a traditional tender specification, which leaves little room for 
innovative solutions, with a specification that is in accordance with directives 2014/24/EU 
and 2014/25/EU. The latter specifies procurement needs in terms of functional requirements, 
takes life-cycle cost considerations into account, and defines innovative aspects (here with 
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respect to energy consumption compared to the current technology in place) as award criteria. 
As such, it creates the necessary preconditions for suppliers to be successful with innovative 
solutions at the tender-stage. In the following, in order to emphasize the importance of said 
contractual arrangements in innovation procurement, we will use the term Public 
Procurement with Contracted Innovation (PPCI) for procurement contracts that specify 
innovation-related activities in accordance with the new regulatory rules.  
Interestingly, Germany was a forerunner in revising its public procurement framework 
and already adopted similar rules in a Procurement Law Amendment Act in 2009 (Falck and 
Wiederhold, 2013). The act unequivocally clarified the legal basis for taking innovative 
aspects into account and defining selection criteria with respect to life-cycle costs and broader 
performance measures of procured products. Germany is thus an ideal laboratory to 
empirically study the effect of policy changes that have only recently been put forward in the 
EU. Although evidence for the impact of reforms at the European level will still take years to 
accumulate, our analysis is able to make predictions about their likely effects by drawing 
lessons from the German experience. 
2.3 Scope of public procurement as innovation policy instrument 
Although the potential for demand-side innovation policies is large in scale, we argue that it is 
still limited in scope. Because public procurement of innovation only recently attracted 
attention as a strategic policy instrument, existing skill sets of procurement agencies are not 
yet well aligned and established organizational cultures only adapt slowly to the new 
requirements (Yeow and Edler, 2012). In particular, relevant market knowledge about the 
range of possible innovative solutions to a given problem and their potential suppliers can be 
missing. Moreover, technical knowledge to properly assess the value and viability of cutting-
edge technologies is rare (Georghiou, Edler, Uyarra, and Yeow, 2014). Consequently, 
innovation activities conducted as part of procurement contracts are unlikely to be of radically 
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new nature. Instead, government agencies will resort to solutions that have already proven to 
be applicable in other closely related contexts. Primarily, such incremental innovations and 
adaptations of already existing products entail a much lower development risk and are less 
prone to failure. Also, as these technologies are already better understood than radically new 
approaches, they are easier to control and describe (Edler, Rolfstam, Tsipouri and Uyarra, 
2015). 
In general, risk aversion among public procurers constitutes a main bottleneck. This 
might be the result of a reluctance to change that is inherent in administrative institutions 
(Edler et al., 2015). Even more decisive, however, is a skewed incentive structure in the 
public sector. Procurers are directly accountable for failures in the procurement process and 
can face personal career consequences in case of obstructions. At the same time, a much 
broader group of stakeholders reaps the benefits of innovative products and services that are 
procured (Yeow and Edler, 2012). Adequate risk management within public organizations, 
which could mitigate the problem, is largely absent (Edler et al., 2015). As these obstacles 
remain unaddressed by recent policy reforms at the European level, we expect a potentially 
positive effect of PPCI to be limited to more incremental innovation efforts. 
For the reasons just stated, we also compare the effect of public procurement with direct 
R&D grants in a robustness check of our empirical study. This is conceptually an interesting 
comparison as it clarifies possible limitations of demand-side innovation policies. It is 
practically impossible for procurers in government agencies to be aware of all feasible 
approaches to innovation and viable (but not yet existing) technologies that potential 
inventors might think of. Bottom-up policies, where firms develop and submit R&D projects 
by themselves, might therefore have an advantage with respect to promoting more novel 
solutions. By contrast, procurement projects may always remain limited in their scientific and 
technological scope because of the top-down character of public procurement as an 
innovation policy instrument. 
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3 Data and Methods 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 about here +++ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
For our empirical analysis we collect a sample of 3410 German firms from the Community 
Innovation Survey9 (CIS)—the official survey of innovation activities by private enterprises 
in the European Union. The German part of the CIS is called Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(MIP) and is conducted annually since 1993 by the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. The 2013 wave of the MIP includes items on firms’ public 
procurement contracts and—relevant for our research question—on public procurement with 
contracted innovation. We make use of a dummy variable which is equal to one if firms were 
awarded one or more public procurement contracts in the period between 2010 and 2012. This 
is the case for almost 20% of firms in our sample. A second dummy variable records whether 
firms conducted any innovation activities that were part of a public procurement contract 
awarded to them (PPCI), which applies to 15.3% of the firms with a public procurement 
contract. In the total population the share of firms that benefitted from PPCI is thus equal to 
about 3% (Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables in our data). Table 5 reveals 
that the lion’s share of PPCI occurs in IT and telecommunications, electronics, and technical 
engineering.10 
3.1 Dependent variables 
Public procurement of innovation involves the sale of goods and services. Consequently, we 
use the share of total turnover a firm made in 2012 with new or significantly improved 
                                                 
9 See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/community-innovation-survey (accessed 30 November 
2017). 
10 Our sample does not include any firm operating in the sector C25.4 (“Manufacture of weapons and 
ammunition”) according to the NACE classification (Rev. 2). In an additional web search we found only five 
(out of 103) firms with PPCI contracts that possibly have ties to the military. We thus conclude that the vast 
majority of observations in our sample represent procurement for civilian rather than defense purposes. 
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products and services that were introduced in a three-year period before, between 2010 and 
2012, as dependent variable. Furthermore, we differentiate between turnover from selling 
products and services that were new to the market (market novelties), with no similar products 
already available before, and those that were new to the respective firm or significant 
improvements of existing products (firm novelties). On average, 8.7% of total turnover were 
attributable to new products, 2% to market novelties, and 6.7% to firm novelties. Split sample 
descriptive statistics of our dependent variables are given in Table 4. It is noteworthy, that 
firms with public procurement contracts, but without PPCI, have very similar average shares 
of turnover with innovative products as the population; whereas firms with PPCI show 
considerably higher shares.  
3.2 Control variables 
Table 3 describes and presents descriptive statistics of a set of control variables that we 
employ throughout our estimations. We control for firm size measured as the number of 
employees. On the one hand, smaller firms may naturally have a higher share of sales with 
new products, as an innovation may have relatively more weight in a total product or service 
portfolio when compared to larger, more diversified firms. On the other hand, larger firms 
may innovate more routinely. Furthermore, we control for the share of high-skilled personnel, 
i.e., employees with a university degree, as a highly skilled workforce might be positively 
associated with a firm’s innovativeness. The innovation intensity itself, measured as 
innovation expenditures divided by sales (in %), is also included as control, for the same 
reason as high-skilled employment. The more resources a firm devotes to innovation, the 
more sales with new products or services it is expected to achieve, independently of any 
public procurement contracts. In order to control for the affinity to innovation in a longer 
historical context, we also include a firms’ knowledge stock, measured as the patent stock 
generated by the perpetual inventory method. To control for factor inputs, we include a firm’s 
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cost per capita, i.e., the sum of wages, materials and energy per employee, in our estimations. 
Furthermore, we include a firm’s share of sales from exporting because competition on 
international markets may induce firms to innovate at higher rates to stay competitive. We 
also control for ownership structure by including a dummy indicating whether a firm is 
associated with a group and whether the parent company is located outside of Germany. 
Finally, we include a dummy for firms located in Eastern Germany, and a set of industry 
dummies based on a 2-digit NACE classification (Rev. 2)11 given in Table 5. To avoid 
simultaneity bias, time-variant control variables are lagged whenever possible.  
3.3 Methods 
We test the effect of PPCI on our three dependent variables in a variety of different 
specifications. As a baseline we present OLS estimations. Subsequently we report results of a 
nearest-neighbor matching to rule out an influence of parametric functional form assumptions. 
Matching estimators are widely applied in the treatment effects literature (Smith and Todd, 
2005) and innovation policy evaluation literature (Zúñiga-Vicente, Alonso-Borrego, 
Forcadell, Galán, 2012; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015). Moreover, because the award of public 
procurement contracts is possibly endogenous, we estimate instrumental variable regressions 
using generated instruments as introduced by Lewbel (2012, 2016). Lewbel shows that in the 
absence of an exclusion restriction (i.e., no traditional instrumental variables are available) 
parameters of a triangular or fully recursive system can still be identified if errors are 
heteroskedastic, which is plausible in many applied settings, and by placing appropriate 
restrictions on the correlation between regressors and the product of error terms. Instruments 
can then be constructed from the variables in the data set without the need for outside 
instruments. Lewbel (2012) demonstrates that the imposed identifying restrictions are fulfilled 
                                                 
11 NACE is comparable to the SIC classification in the US. See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Statistical_classification_of_economic_activities_in_the_European_Community_(
NACE) (accessed 30 November 2017). 
14 
in many standard econometric settings, such as in the presence of an unobserved single factor 
or classic measurement error. However, since identification is based on higher moments, 
estimates should be less robust compared to standard instrumental variable approaches. 
Furthermore, in the case of a binary endogenous regressor the method relies on strong 
distributional assumptions (Lewbel, 2016). For this reason we present a final robustness check 
in which we make use of the longitudinal character of the German CIS to estimate a 
difference-in-differences specification. Details on this approach are deferred to Section 4.4. 
4 Estimation Results 
4.1 Cross-sectional OLS regressions 
---------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 6 about here +++ 
---------------------------------------------- 
presents our baseline OLS results. If we only control for industry affiliation we find positive 
and statistically significant (at the 1%-level) effects of PPCI on all three of our outcome 
variables (column 1, 3, and 6). At the same time, there is no significant effect of standard 
public procurement without contracted innovation on the share of turnover from selling new 
products and services, market novelties, or firm novelties.12 
Once we control for other possibly confounding influences, the estimated effects of 
PPCI become substantially smaller. Nevertheless, coefficients remain positive and statistically 
significant in the regressions with turnover from new products (p < 0.001) and firm novelties 
(p = 0.001) as dependent variables. Point estimates are also economically significant. PPCI 
increases the share of firms’ turnover with new products and services in general by about 8.7 
percentage points and turnover with firm novelties by almost 7 percentage points. By contrast, 
                                                 
12 Note that, since PPCI is zero if public procurement is absent, both variables together can be interpreted 
as an interaction term where the product term would be collinear with PPCI and therefore drops out of the 
regressions. 
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as hypothesized in Section 2.3, we find no statistically significant effect on market novelties 
(p = 0.224). 
---------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 7 about here +++ 
---------------------------------------------- 
Coefficients of control variables have expected signs. In particular, the innovation 
intensity of a firm and the share of high-skilled employees are positively related to turnover 
with innovations. Also, a higher share of turnover from exports is positively associated with 
innovative sales. Firms located in Eastern Germany have a higher share of turnover with new 
products and services. This effect, however, is restricted to firm novelties, which points to the 
catch-up process that is still taking place in the ex-communist part of Germany. 
Table 7 shows that our OLS results remain unchanged if we control for other types of 
public support measures for R&D, i.e., whether a firm received an R&D grant between 2010 
and 2012. Interestingly, unlike PPCI, R&D grants are positively associated with both turnover 
from market novelties and firm novelties (see Section 5 for a further discussion of this 
finding). 
---------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 8 about here +++ 
---------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Cross-sectional analysis using matching techniques 
We perform a nearest-neighbor matching using Mahalanobis distances (Table 8) in order to 
confirm that these results are not driven by parametric model assumptions. In a first step, we 
find matched pairs within the sample of firms with a public procurement contract that are 
similar in terms of the covariates used in Table 6. 
Subsequently, we perform the same matching with the added restriction that matched 
pairs need to be equal (exact matching) with regard to whether they received a public R&D 
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grant. After the matching we generally find a good covariate balance with only insignificant 
differences remaining in the control variables between treatment and control group.13  
Although estimated standard errors become larger, results of the nearest-neighbor 
matching are close to our baseline OLS estimates. There is a significant average treatment 
effect on the treated of PPCI on the share of turnover with new products and services (p = 
0.033). The treatment effect on firm novelties is still significant at the 10%-level (p = 0.059). 
As before, we find no significant effect of PPCI on turnover with market novelties. The same 
holds if we require an exact matching on R&D grant. Here the estimated treatment effect on 
firms’ turnover with firm novelties is again significant at the 5%-level (p = 0.038). Note that 
this procedure does not allow to assess whether R&D grants themselves have positive effects 
on the dependent variable (as in the OLS regressions performed above). This would require a 
fully-fledged heterogeneous treatment effects analysis as done in, e.g., Czarnitzki, 
Ebersberger, Fier, (2007), for R&D grants and R&D co-operation as treatments, or Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014) for R&D grants from the European Commission versus national 
subsidies. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper as we are mainly interested in 
the effect of PPCI and its robustness if direct R&D grants are taken into account.  
---------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 9 about here +++ 
---------------------------------------------- 
In Table 9 we report our instrumental variable (IV) regression results accounting for the 
possible endogeneity of public procurement and PPCI. Following Lewbel (2012, 2016) we 
exploit heteroscedasticity in the first stage residuals of a two stage least squares regression, 
and construct a vector of instruments (ܺ −  തܺ)ߝଶ̂, where ܺ corresponds to the exogenous 
                                                 
13 Tests on covariate differences are shown in the supplemental material to this paper. Note that we do not 
report results of the popular propensity score matching in detail. Frölich, Huber and Wiesenfarth (2017) perform 
simulation studies using different matching estimators and conclude that direct matching estimators have 
preferable finite sample properties. We point out, however, that propensity score matching leads to similar 
results in our case. We also performed a 5-nearest-neighbor matching and found results to be robust (see the 
supplemental material to this paper). 
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variables in the model and ߝଶ̂ to the first-stage residuals. Note that heteroscedasticity arises 
naturally in a setting with binary endogenous regressors. Point estimates for the coefficients 
of interest increase moderately compared to the OLS. They are again significant at the 5%-
level in the regression of turnover with new products and services (p < 0.001) and with firm 
novelties (p = 0.002). At the same time, the coefficient of PPCI remains insignificant in the 
regression on market novelties (p = 0.114), which is in line with the results we established so 
far. First-stage F statistics are sufficiently large such that we do not need to worry about weak 
identification. Overidentifying restrictions tests do not reject the null for any of the estimated 
models in Table 9. 
4.3 Further robustness tests using cross-sectional data 
In unreported estimations (reported in the supplemental material to this paper) we find similar 
results for all our cross-sectional specifications (OLS and IV) if we restrict the sample to only 
include firms that were awarded a public procurement contracts between 2010 and 2012. 
4.4 Robustness check using panel data 
In Germany, unlike in other European countries (Peters and Rammer, 2013), the Community 
Innovation Survey is conducted annually and not only every second year as in most other 
countries and the sampling is designed as a panel, i.e. to the largest possible extent the same 
firms are traced over time. Note, however, that although an effort is made to survey firms 
repeatedly, not all firms respond in each year. We are able to retrieve longitudinal information 
for 1310 firms from the 2013 sample that responded at least in one other wave. This results in 
an unbalanced panel covering the years 2006 to 2008 and 2010 to 2015, with a minimum of 
two, and a maximum of nine observations per firm (2 ≤ ܶ ≤ 9).14 In total, the panel contains 
5619 firm-year observations. 
                                                 
14 We exclude information from 2009, as the public procurement policy change occurred in this year. 
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Unfortunately, items on public procurement contracts of firms are not part of the 
standard CIS questionnaire and were only included in the 2013 wave. We therefore resort to 
the Tender Electronics Daily (TED15) database provided by the European Commission, which 
lists detailed information about procurement contracts awarded within the European 
Economic Area. We construct the dummy Public Procurement (TED), equal to one if a firm 
won a procurement contract in a given year. However, this comes with a caveat. In general, it 
is only mandatory to publish procurement tenders in TED that exceed a certain threshold in 
value.16 Although publishing tenders with below-threshold values is “considered good 
practice” and encouraged,17 some procurement contracts of smaller scale might not be 
captured. This limitation of the TED data has to be kept in mind for the interpretation of 
results. The treatment variable PPCI is again constructed from the 2013 wave of the German 
CIS. PPCI is set to one in all years after 2009 if a firm won a respective contract between 
2010 and 2012, and remains zero otherwise. Ultimately, this allows us to make use of fixed-
effects models that control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This specification is a 
generalization of the difference-in-differences estimator for ܶ ≥ 2.  
As the within variation of our dependent variables measured in shares is low, we take 
the absolute values of turnover from new products and services, market novelties, and firm 
novelties. We estimate Poisson fixed-effects regressions (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 
1984), which model the conditional mean of the data as ܧ(ݕ௜௧|ݔ௜ଵ, … , ݔ௜்,ܿ௜) = ܿ௜ exp( ݔ௜௧, ߚ), 
with ܿ௜ being an unobserved firm-specific effect. This specification is similar to using log( ݕ) 
                                                 
15 TED csv dataset (2006-2015), Tenders Electronic Daily, supplement to the Official Journal of the 
European Union. DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and SMEs, European Commission, Brussels. 
Available at https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/ted-csv. Version 2.1. Accessed on 30 November 2017. 
16 Directive 2014/24/EU specifies the following thresholds: (a) EUR 5186000 for public works contracts; 
(b) EUR 134000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by central government authorities and design 
contests organized by such authorities; (c) EUR 207 000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by sub-
central contracting authorities and design contests organized by such authorities; (d) EUR 750 000 for public 
service contracts for social and other specific services. These thresholds are regularly adjusted for inflation. 
17 See: http://data.europa.eu/euodp/repository/ec/dg-grow/mapps/TED(csv)_data_information.pdf. For an 
analysis of below-threshold publication rates in TED see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/15421/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native (both accessed 
30 November 2017). 
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as dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 648), without the added complication of 
logarithms being undefined at zero. Both of these features are relevant in our case as the 
distributions of firm turnover are substantially skewed and firms may report zero sales with 
new products. In addition, the Poisson fixed-effects estimator has desirable robustness 
properties (Wooldridge, 1999). 
---------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 10 about here +++ 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 10 reports panel descriptive statistics separately for firms with PPCI contracts 
(treated) and for those without (untreated); respectively before the policy change (before 
2009) and after (after 2009). On average, turnover with new products decreases from EUR 
4.43 million for untreated firms before 2009 to EUR 3.95 million after 2009. By contrast, 
sales figures increase for treated firms from EUR 5.05 million on average to EUR 6.12 
million. Consistent with our cross-sectional results, the increase for treated firms is driven by 
innovative products that are new to the firm only. Turnover from market novelties decreases 
both for treated and untreated firms. 
---------------------------------------------- 
+++ Insert Table 11 about here +++ 
---------------------------------------------- 
This pattern, which is already visible in the descriptive statistics, is confirmed by our 
estimation results in Table 11. PPCI has a significantly positive effect on turnover from new 
products and services, and firm novelties. Having won a PPCI contract (between 2010 and 
2012) on average increases firms’ yearly innovation turnover (after 2009) by 100 ∙
(exp(0.422) − 1) = 52.5%. The effect on market novelties remains insignificant. 
Interestingly, the introduction of control variables in the estimation does not affect results by 
much; in contrast to our cross-sectional estimations where incorporating controls resulted in 
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substantially smaller coefficients. This can be explained by the fixed effect already picking up 
a substantial part of the confounding heterogeneity otherwise captured by controls. 
To make sure that the dependent variables of treated and untreated firms exhibit a 
common trend before 2009 we conduct a pseudo-treatment test by interacting the treatment 
indicator with time dummies in the pre-2009 sample. Reassuringly, we found no statistically 
significant interactions. Detailed results are reported in the supplemental material to this 
paper. 
4.5 Population-level impact 
In this paragraph we conduct a “back of the envelope” calculation in order to get an idea 
about the impact of PPCI at the population level. According to Aschoff et al. (2014) the 
sample that was collected in the 2013 wave of the German CIS represents a population of 
276,600 firms. It covers all industries listed in Table 5, including mining, manufacturing, 
energy and water supply, and service sectors such as wholesale trade, engineering, 
management consulting, and various other business and ICT-related services (Peters and 
Rammer, 2013). The vast majority of business R&D is expected to occur in these sectors.  
The share of firms with PPCI, extrapolated to the population level, amounts to 1.76% 
(Aschoff et al., 2014). Thus, 4,868 (1.76% ∙ 276,600) firms in Germany won a PPCI contract 
between 2010 and 2012. According to our OLS results in column 2 of Table 6 these firms 
enjoyed an 8.666 percentage points higher share of total turnover with new products and 
services in 2012. Given that the average firm with PPCI in our sample reported EUR 30.83 
million in sales, we find that EUR 2.67 million of this turnover was attributable to PPCI. 
Multiplied by 4,868 firms this leads to a total impact of EUR 13 billion, which represents 
0.37% of German GDP in 2012.  
We find a very similar effect if we base the calculation on our difference-in-differences 
results. The coefficient of 0.422 we obtain in the Poisson model in Table 11 translates into a 
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marginal effect of 52.5%. Multiplied by the average pre-treatment turnover with new products 
for treated firms, equal to EUR 5.05 million (Table 10), and further multiplied by 4,868 
firms, we arrive at a population-level impact of EUR 12.9 billion.  
Under the assumption that procurement expenditures in the German public sector did 
not increase substantially between 2010 and 2012, the sizeable estimate of PPCI’s 
additionality suggests a success of the policy. By changing their demand behavior and 
redirecting existing budgets towards more innovative products and services, public authorities 
were able to improve the market conditions for innovations significantly. This interpretation is 
supported by OECD statistics, which indicate that the share of general government 
procurement as a percentage of GDP in Germany remained stable between 2010 and 2012 
(with a mean of 14.9 and standard deviation of 0.15).18  
Ultimately, however, we would like to judge the success of the policy based on whether 
it creates additional demand for innovations on top of public expenditures. Only in this case, 
public procurement would play a catalytic role and pave the way for subsequent market 
success with customers from the private sector (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). Unfortunately, 
we do not know the aggregate level of PPCI in terms of value. Micro-level data sources such 
as TED do not categorize procurement contracts accordingly. In Section 2.1 the potential of 
public procurement of innovation in Germany was estimated to be EUR 25 billion per year. 
Currently, however, this still seems to be a gross overestimation of the actual budgets spent. It 
thus remains unclear whether the EUR 13 billion additional turnover in 2012 that we find 
contain any catalytic component. 
5 Discussion 
We have presented evidence for a positive effect of PPCI on firms’ innovation output across 
several econometric specifications. Although, taken individually, these specifications might 
                                                 
18 See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GOV_2015 (accessed 30 November 2017). 
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not be able to eliminate all endogeneity concerns, together they point to a very consistent 
picture. Our baseline specification relies on a cross-section of firms in the period immediately 
after the 2009 revision of public procurement regulations in Germany. We find a large and 
robust effect of PPCI. At the same time, the effect of standard public procurement without 
contracted innovations remains insignificant throughout. From our results we conclude that 
policy reforms laying the legal foundations for PPCI—such as Germany’s amendment act, or, 
more recently, directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU at the European level—are beneficial 
for stimulating innovation activities in the economy. We find further evidence confirming this 
interpretation in matching and IV estimations, as well as in panel fixed-effects specifications, 
after augmenting our data with additional information from the TED database. 
In light of the considerable impact of PPCI—EUR 13 billion additional turnover with 
new products and services in 2012 alone, without a noticeable upswing in public procurement 
expenditures—the share of PPCI, being equal to 1.76% in the population, is still low. 
Although it is plausible that the average impact of the policy might decrease once it will be 
expanded to a larger group of firms, there seems to be room for achieving an even larger 
impact at the macro level. To this end, PPCI’s advantages need to be publicized more widely 
in the public sector and procurement agencies need to be equipped with the necessary skills to 
apply the new strategic instrument. Whether PPCI also has a catalytic effect, in that it creates 
additional private demand for innovations, remains a question for future research. Currently, 
we are unable to compare its additionality to the level of public expenditures on PPCI, as the 
latter is unknown. In addition, we would require more detailed data on the amount and value 
of PPCI contracts that individual firms win. Augmenting the TED database with a 
classification into types of innovation procurement would be helpful in this regard.  
A key finding of our study is that PPCI raises turnover with products and services that 
are new to the firm but not new to the market. These types of more incremental innovations 
are more easily understood and pose a smaller risk to procurers than radically new 
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approaches. Hence, public procurement of innovation is mainly suitable for inducing the 
diffusion of technologies and upgrading of already existing product portfolios. This result is 
consistent with our finding that R&D grants are positively associated with both turnover from 
market novelties and firm novelties. Grants and subsidies, unlike public procurement, have 
more of a bottom-up character, as firms are able to request funding for research projects they 
develop by themselves. In that way, problems posed by information asymmetries are 
mitigated. Consequently, our results point to the importance of a policy mix that combines 
top-down instruments, such as public procurement, with bottom-up approaches, such as R&D 
subsidies. 
Nevertheless, by improving public risk management and strengthening the commitment 
to innovation procurement at the superordinate political level, incentives for procurers to 
consider more radical innovations could be increased. One possible way would be to more 
frequently combine PPCI with pre-commercial procurement (PCP) upstream. PCP refers to 
the purchase of direct R&D services from private firms by the government (Edquist and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). It is particularly useful in situations where commercial 
solutions to address public needs do not yet exist. Consulting several possible suppliers 
simultaneously and following, for instance, a staged process to gradually select the most 
suitable approach can thereby improve the risk management capabilities of public authorities. 
Subsequently, radically new solutions, which have proven their viability in the PCP process, 
could be disseminated more widely with the help of PPCI. 
Finally, we would like to stress that our results are also informative for countries outside 
of the EU. According to a survey in 2015, existing legal and regulatory frameworks constitute 
a main obstacle for the implementation of public procurement of innovation in OECD 
countries because they do not provide sufficient clarity about the lawfulness of innovation-
related aspects as selection criteria (OECD, 2017). In the United States, for example, 
individual federal agencies enjoy a much larger discretionary power in their procurement 
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procedures. This results in “best practice” examples, such as the Department of Defense, 
which possesses ample experience with technology procurement (Mowery, 2010). However, a 
general focus on public procurement of innovation as a strategic policy tool remains still 
limited. Outside of defense and national security, regulatory frameworks that provide 
appropriate guidance to procurement offices are missing (Vonortas, 2015). Because of legal 
uncertainty and a resulting fear of litigation, procurers tend to overspecify the to-be-procured 
products and services in tender calls. As argued in Section 2.2, this is detrimental to the 
success of innovative solutions. Therefore, the US might benefit from reconsidering their 
discretionary approach to public procurement of innovation and adopting a more 
comprehensive set of rules comparable to those implemented in the EU.  
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we presented empirical evidence for the effectiveness of Public Procurement 
with Contracted Innovation (PPCI) as a policy instrument to stimulate private innovation 
activities. Germany’s experience with the instrument after its introduction in 2009 documents 
a positive effect of PPCI on firms’ turnover with innovative products and services. We find 
robust empirical results across a wide set of specifications, including cross-sectional OLS and 
nearest-neighbor matching, as well as IV and difference-in-difference estimators, 
implemented as panel fixed-effect regressions. The impact of PPCI seems limited, however, 
to products and services that are merely new to the firm. Because of insufficient incentives to 
opt for radically new solutions and the lack of an appropriate risk management in the public 
sector, procurers limit the scope of PPCI to innovations of more incremental character that 
bear a lower development risk. 
Our analysis reveals that standard public procurement without contracted innovation has 
no effect on turnover with innovative products and services. We therefore conclude that 
Germany’s efforts to reform its public procurement framework, and put the implementation of 
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PPCI on a solid legal basis, were successful. At the European level, we expect a comparable 
impact of the revised public procurement directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU, once they 
are adopted universally at the national level. Our results inform the academic literature about 
the—previously ignored—importance of contractual specifications in innovation 
procurement. Likewise, our paper might motivate other countries outside of the EU to adopt 
similar regulatory frameworks that explicitly allow for PPCI. 
References 
Abadie, A., and Imbens, G. W. (2006). Large sample properties of matching estimators for 
average treatment effects. Econometrica 74: 235–267. 
Abadie, A., and Imbens, G. W.  (2011). Bias-corrected matching estimators for average 
treatment effects. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29: 1–11. 
Appelt, S., and Galindo-Rueda, F. (2016). Measuring the Link between Public Procurement 
and Innovation. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2016/03. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlvc7sl1w7h-en 
Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources for Invention. In 
National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: 
Economic and Social Factors. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 609–626. 
Aschhoff, B., Crass, D., Doherr, T., Hud, M., Hünermund, P., Iferd, Y., Köhler, C., 
Peters, B., Rammer, C., Schubert, T., and Schwiebacher, F. (2014). Dokumentation 
zur Innovationserhebung 2013. Dokumentation Nr. 14-01. Mannheim, Germany: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW). http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/docus/dokumentation1401.pdf  
Aschoff, B., and Sofka, W. (2009). Innovation on demand—Can public procurement drive 
market success of innovations? Research Policy 38, 1235–1247. 
Czarnitzki, D., Ebersberger B., and Fier A., (2007). The relationship between R&D 
collaboration, subsidies and R&D performance: empirical evidence from Finland and 
Germany. Journal of Applied Econometrics 22(7), 1347 - 1366. 
Czarnitzki D., Lopes-Bento C., (2014). Innovation subsidies: Does the funding source 
matter for innovation intensity and performance? Empirical evidence from Germany. 
Industry and Innovation 21(5), 380-409. 
Decarolis, F. (2014). Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence 
from Procurement Auctions. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6 (1): 
108–132. 
Dechezleprêtre, A., Einiö, E., Martin, R., Nguyen, K., Van Reenen, J. (2016). Do Tax 
Incentives for Research Increase Firm Innovation? An RD Design for R&D. NBER 
Working Paper 2240. 
Draca, M. (2013) Reagan’s innovation dividend? Technological impacts of the 1980s US 
defense build-up. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University 
of Warwick. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/59342 
Edler, J., and Georghiou, L. (2007). Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side. Research Policy 36, 949–963. 
Edler, J., Rolfstam, M., Tsipouri, L., and Uyarra, E. (2015). Risk management in public 
procurement of innovation: a conceptualization. In Edquist, C., Vonortas, N. S., Zabala-
26 
Iturriagagoiti, J. M., and Edler, J. (eds), Public Procurement for Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 87–109.  
Edquist C., Vonortas N. S., and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J. M. (2015). Introduction. In 
Edquist, C., Vonortas, N. S., Zabala-Iturriagagoiti, J. M., and Edler, J. (eds), Public Procurement 
for Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1–34. 
Edquist C., and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J. M. (2012). Public Procurement for Innovation as 
mission-oriented innovation policy. Research Policy 41, 1757–1769. 
EFI – Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation (2013). Gutachten zu Forschung, 
Innovation und technologischer Leistungsfähigkeit Deutschlands. http://www.e-
fi.de/fileadmin/Gutachten/EFI_2013_Gutachten_deu.pdf  
Einiö, E. (2014). R&D subsidies and company performance: evidence from geographic 
variation in government funding based on the ERDF population-density rule. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 96(4), 710–728. 
European Commission (2003). Raising EU R&D Intensity – Improving the Effectiveness of 
Public Support Mechanisms for Private Sector Research and Development: Direct 
Measures. Brussels, Belgium: Directorate-General for Research, Information and 
Communication Unit. 
European Commission (2015). State of the Innovation Union.  Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union. 
Eßig, M., Schaupp, M., Jungclaus, M., and Kurz, S. (2014). Impulse für mehr 
Innovationen im öffentlichen Beschaffungswesen. Berlin: Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Energie. 
Falck, O., and Wiederhold, S. (2013). Nachfrageorientierte Innovationspolitik: 
Bestandaufnahme und ökonomische Bewertung. Ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung 
51. 
Frölich, M., Huber, M., and Wiesenfarth, M. (2017). The finite sample performance of 
semi- and nonparametric estimators for treatment effects and policy evaluation, 
Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, forthcoming. 
Georghiou, L., Edler, J., Uyarrra, E., and Yeow, J. (2014). Policy instruments for public 
procurement of innovation: Choice, design and assessment. Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change 86, 1–12. 
Guerzoni, M., and Raiteri, E. (2015). Demand-side vs. supply-side technology policies: 
Hidden treatment and new empirical evidence on the policy mix. Research Policy 44, 
726–747. 
Hausman, J., Hall, B. H., and Griliches, Z. (1984). Econometric Models for Count Data 
with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship. Econometrica 52(4), 909–938. 
Hall, B. H., Lerner, J. (2010). The Financing of R&D and Innovation. In Hall, B. H., and 
Rosenberg, N. (eds), Handbook of The Economics of Innovation, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 609–639. 
Howell, S. T. (2017). Financing Innovation: Evidence from R&D Grants. American 
Economic Review 107(4), 1136–1164. 
Hyytinen, A., Lundberg, S., Toivanen, O. (2017). Design of Public Procurement Auctions: 
Evidence from Cleaning Contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.  
Lewbel, A. (2012). Using heteroscedasticity to identify and estimate mismeasured and 
endogenous regressor models. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 30(1), 67–80. 
Lewbel, A. (2016). Identification and Estimation Using Heteroscedasticity Without 
Instruments: The Binary Endogenous Regressor Case. Mimeo. 
https://www2.bc.edu/arthur-lewbel/het-binary5.pdf 
Lewis, G., Bajari, P. (2011). Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and 
Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(3), 1173–1211. 
27 
Lichtenberg, F. R. (1988). The Private R and D Investment Response to Federal Design and 
Technical Competitions. The American Economic Review 78(3), 550–559. 
Mowery, D. C. (2010). Military R&D and Innovation. In Hall, B. H., and Rosenberg, N. 
(eds), Handbook of The Economics of Innovation, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1219–
1256. 
OECD (2016). OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2016. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_in_outlook-2016-en 
OECD (2017). Public Procurement for Innovation: Good Practices and Strategies. Paris: 
OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264265820-en 
Peters, B., and Rammer, C. (2013). Innovation panel surveys in Germany. In Gault, F. (ed), 
Handbook of Innovation Indicators and Measurement. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 135–177. 
Slavtchev, V., and Wiederhold, S. (2016). Does the Technological Content of Government 
Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States. American Economic 
Journal: Macroeconomics 8(2): 45–84. 
Smith, J., and Todd, P. (2005). Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s Critique of 
Nonexperimental Estimators? Journal of Econometrics 125(1-2), 305–353. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (1999). Distribution-Free Estimation of Some Nonlinear Panel Data 
Models. Journal of Econometrics 90, 77–97. 
Valovirta V. (2015). Building capability for public procurement of innovation. In Edquist, C., 
Vonortas, N. S., Zabala-Iturriagagoiti, J. M., and Edler, J. (eds), Public Procurement for 
Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 65–86. 
Van Meerveld, H., Nauta, J., and Whyles, G. (2012). Forward commitment procurement and its 
effect on perceived risks in PPI projects. In Edquist, C., Vonortas, N. S., Zabala-Iturriagagoiti, J. 
M., and Edler, J. (eds), Public Procurement for Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 110–146. 
Vonortas, V. (2015). Innovation and public procurement in the United States. In Edquist, C., 
Vonortas, N. S., Zabala-Iturriagagoiti, J. M., and Edler, J. (eds), Public Procurement for 
Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 147–178. 
Yeow, J., and Edler, J. (2012). Innovation procurement as projects. Journal of Public Procurement 
12(4), 472–505. 
Zúñiga-Vicente, J. A., Alonso-Borrego, C., Forcadell, F. J., and Galán, J. I. (2012). 
Assessing the effect of public subsidies on firm R&D investment: a survey. Journal of 
Economic Surveys 28(1): 36–67. 
 
  
28 
Tables 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables:      
Turnover New 
Products (%) 
Share of turnover with new 
products and services in 2012 
(in %) 
8.723 18.731 0 100 
Turnover Market 
Novelties (%) 
Share of turnover with new 
products and services that 
were market novelties in 2012 
(in %) 
2.022 8.336 0 100 
Turnover Firm 
Novelties (%) 
Share of turnover with new 
products and services that 
were not market novelties in 
2012 (in %) 
6.701 15.916 0 100 
Treatment Variables:      
Public Procurement Public procurement contract 
awarded between 2010 to 2012 
0.198  0 1 
Public Procurement 
with Contracted 
Innovation (PPCI) 
Innovation activities were part 
of a procurement contract 
awarded between 2010 to 2012 
0.030  0 1 
Control Variables:      
Innovation Intensity Innovation expenditures over 
sales in 2012 (in %) 
4.144 11.808 0 100 
Firm Size Number of employees in 2011 101.991 730.533 1 33556 
High-skilled 
Employees 
Share of employees holding a 
university degree in 2011 (in 
%) 
20.026 26.196 0 100 
Knowledge Stock Discounted stock of patent 
applications at EPO in 2011 
(since 2001, 15% discount 
factor) 
0.370 4.217 0 146.1 
Cost Per Capita Expenditures for wages, 
materials, energy and other 
inputs per employee (in 
million EUR) in 2011 
0.103 0.156 0 2.491 
Export Share Export sales over total sales in 
2012 (in %) 
11.736 21.989 0 100 
Group Firm is part of a group 0.217  0 1 
Foreign Group Firm is part of a group with 
headquarter outside of 
Germany 
0.049  0 1 
East German Firm is located in Eastern 
Germany 
0.387  0 1 
R&D Grant Firm received a public R&D 
grant between 2010 and 2012 
0.1666  0 1 
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Table 4: Split sample descriptive statistics 
 Public Procurement = 0 Public Procurement = 1 
  PPCI = 0 PPCI = 1 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Turnover New Products (%) 8.119 18.302 8.410 17.742 26.496 25.602 
Turnover Market Novelties (%) 1.840 8.089 1.984 8.186 7.058 12.927 
Turnover Firm Novelties (%) 6.279 15.623 6.426 15.023 19.438 22.154 
 
Table 5: Industry dummies 
Industries NACE (Rev. 2.0) 
% of all 
Firms 
% of firms 
with PP 
% of firms with 
PPCI 
Food/Beverages/Tobacco 10, 11, 12 4.90 1.48 0.97 
Textiles/Clothing 13, 14, 15 3.64 1.48 0.97 
Wood/Paper 16, 17 3.11 2.07 0.00 
Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals 20, 21 3.17 2.37 4.85 
Rubber/Plastics 22 2.61 0.59 0.97 
Glass/Ceramics/Concrete 23 2.40 2.07 1.94 
Metals 24, 25 7.48 5.48 3.88 
Electronics/Electrical 26, 27 6.48 9.93 20.39 
Machinery/Equipment 28, 33 7.01 7.26 4.85 
Vehicles 29, 30 2.29 2.37 3.88 
Furniture/Other Manufacturing 31, 32 3.55 4.44 1.94 
Energy/Mining/Oil 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 35 3.17 3.41 0.97 
Water Supply/Waste/Recycling 36, 37, 38, 39 4.57 5.63 0.97 
Wholesale Trade 46 3.28 3.85 0.97 
Transportation/Postal Services 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 79 7.24 4.15 2.91 
Printing/Publishing/Media 18, 58, 59, 60 3.96 3.70 2.91 
IT-Services/Telecommunications 61, 62, 63 4.22 7.56 15.53 
Financial Intermediation 64, 65, 66 2.35 0.74 0.00 
Consulting/Advertising 69, 70, 73 5.45 3.56 6.80 
Technical Engineering/R&D 71, 72 8.06 14.22 18.45 
Other Producer Services 74, 78, 80, 81, 82 6.04 7.11 2.91 
Other  5.01 6.52 2.91 
30 
Table 6: OLS estimation results 
 Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market Novelties 
(%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PPCI 18.086*** 8.666*** 5.074*** 1.708 13.011*** 6.958*** 
 (2.619) (2.423) (1.313) (1.404) (2.262) (2.143) 
Public Procurement 0.291 0.037 0.144 0.086 0.148 -0.049 
 (0.820) (0.728) (0.375) (0.353) (0.695) (0.653) 
Innovation Intensity  0.510***  0.221***  0.289*** 
  (0.058)  (0.044)  (0.046) 
Firm Size  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
High-skilled 
Employees 
 0.063***  0.021**  0.042*** 
  (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
Knowledge Stock  -0.071  0.004  -0.075 
  (0.072)  (0.037)  (0.048) 
Cost Per Capita  -1.261  -0.887*  -0.373 
  (1.632)  (0.524)  (1.578) 
Export Share  0.097***  0.028***  0.069*** 
  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.017) 
Group  1.647*  0.429  1.218 
  (0.845)  (0.389)  (0.769) 
Foreign Group  -3.097*  -0.998  -2.099 
  (1.774)  (0.763)  (1.641) 
East German  1.290**  -0.116  1.406** 
  (0.598)  (0.282)  (0.548) 
Constant 8.119*** 1.612* 1.840*** -0.003 6.279*** 1.615* 
 (0.350) (0.867) (0.155) (0.249) (0.299) (0.833) 
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.250 0.011 0.154 0.019 0.153 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
N = 3410. Industry dummies included.  
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Table 7: OLS results controlling for R&D grants 
 Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market Novelties 
(%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PPCI 7.414*** 1.318 6.096*** 
 (2.450) (1.439) (2.139) 
Public Procurement 0.039 0.087 -0.047 
 (0.723) (0.350) (0.654) 
R&D Grant 7.070*** 2.204*** 4.866*** 
 (1.159) (0.606) (1.032) 
Innovation Intensity 0.447*** 0.202*** 0.245*** 
 (0.059) (0.045) (0.047) 
Firm Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High-skilled Employees 0.048*** 0.017** 0.031** 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) 
Knowledge Stock -0.067 0.005 -0.072* 
 (0.063) (0.035) (0.042) 
Cost Per Capita -0.867 -0.764 -0.102 
 (1.582) (0.523) (1.548) 
Export Share 0.082*** 0.023** 0.059*** 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) 
Group 1.607* 0.416 1.191 
 (0.839) (0.390) (0.765) 
Foreign Group -2.588 -0.839 -1.749 
 (1.774) (0.760) (1.634) 
East German 1.044* -0.193 1.237** 
 (0.587) (0.279) (0.540) 
Constant 1.699** 0.024 1.675** 
 (0.866) (0.252) (0.831) 
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.161 0.162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
N = 3410. Industry dummies included. 
 
Table 8: Nearest-neighbor matching results 
 
Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market Novelties 
(%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PPCI 
7.710** 1.697 6.013* 
(3.607) (1.856) (3.181) 
PPCI (require exact 
matching of R&D 
Grant) 
8.496** 1.835 6.661** 
(3.523) (1.718) (3.209) 
Standard errors according to Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
N = 675. Control variables as in Table 6. Results denote average treatment effect on treated of PPCI in sample 
of firms with public procurement contracts. 
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Table 9: IV regression results using generated instruments as in Lewbel (2012) 
 Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market 
Novelties (%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PPCI 10.288*** 2.606 7.682*** 
 (2.760) (1.650) (2.446) 
Public Procurement -1.850 -0.854 -0.997 
 (1.498) (0.785) (1.259) 
Innovation Intensity 0.508*** 0.220*** 0.288*** 
 (0.058) (0.044) (0.046) 
Firm Size -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High-skilled Employees 0.063*** 0.021** 0.042*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.015) 
Knowledge Stock -0.070 0.004 -0.074 
 (0.073) (0.037) (0.048) 
Cost Per Capita -1.255 -0.882* -0.373 
 (1.619) (0.518) (1.569) 
Export Share 0.096*** 0.027*** 0.069*** 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) 
Group 1.609* 0.410 1.199 
 (0.842) (0.387) (0.767) 
Foreign Group -3.197* -1.046 -2.150 
 (1.769) (0.762) (1.636) 
East German 1.384** -0.069 1.453*** 
 (0.598) (0.281) (0.550) 
Constant 1.702** 0.042 1.660** 
 (0.862) (0.252) (0.827) 
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.152 0.153 
Cragg-Donald F Statistic 14.323 14.323 14.323 
Hansen’s J Statistic 70.753 64.561 63.341 
P-value Hansen’s J 0.121 0.258 0.294 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Instrumented: PPCI, Public Procurement 
N = 3410. Industry dummies included. 
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Table 10: Panel descriptive statistics 
 Before 2009 After 2009 
 Untreated Treated Untreated Treated 
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent Variables:         
Turnover New 
Products (mill. EUR) 4.43 21.02 5.05 18.32 3.95 23.36 6.12 21.56 
Turnover Market 
Novelties (mill. EUR) 
1.04 9.38 2.44 11.06 0.94 9.42 1.63 9.20 
Turnover Firm 
Novelties (mill. EUR) 
3.43 17.42 2.61 7.98 2.83 18.37 4.66 16.63 
Control Variables:         
Public Procurement 
(TED) 
0.02 0.14 0.06 0.25 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.23 
Innovation Intensity 7.18 13.50 16.02 21.65 6.80 13.74 13.58 16.20 
Firm Size 125.30 468.57 146.58 421.65 118.00 458.78 162.39 471.61 
High-skilled 
Employees 
22.32 25.35 38.23 29.78 25.69 27.13 44.99 31.19 
Cost Per Capita 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.04 
Export Share 18.85 24.72 23.03 25.77 19.92 26.25 24.07 27.24 
N = 5619 firm-year observations covering the years 2006 to 2008 and 2010 to 2015 
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Table 11: Poisson fixed effects estimation results 
 Turn. New Products Turn. Market Novelties Turn. Firm Novelties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PPCI 0.496*** 0.422** 0.202 0.171 0.760*** 0.763*** 
 (0.123) (0.201) (0.266) (0.293) (0.168) (0.251) 
Public Procurement 
(TED) 
-0.073 -0.069 0.269 0.293 -0.226 -0.212 
 (0.177) (0.179) (0.366) (0.369) (0.261) (0.260) 
Innovation Intensity  -0.002  -0.002  -0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.009) 
Firm Size  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
High-skilled 
Employees  -0.007**  0.004  -0.010** 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Cost Per Capita  0.246  -0.838  0.354* 
  (0.195)  (1.126)  (0.189) 
Export Share  -0.003  -0.016  0.002 
  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.005) 
Year:       
2007 0.029 0.015 0.078 0.128 0.026 -0.006 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.263) (0.267) (0.132) (0.133) 
2008 0.341* 0.351* 0.662* 0.713** 0.236 0.240 
 (0.174) (0.183) (0.363) (0.360) (0.195) (0.200) 
2010 0.007 0.021 0.374 0.421 -0.095 -0.161 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.275) (0.275) (0.211) (0.217) 
2011 -0.125 -0.131 -0.035 0.048 -0.224 -0.249 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.395) (0.405) (0.156) (0.157) 
2012 -0.095 -0.075 0.298 0.407 -0.215 -0.204 
 (0.155) (0.160) (0.288) (0.290) (0.165) (0.166) 
2013 -0.253 -0.280* -0.535 -0.502 -0.190 -0.210 
 (0.184) (0.162) (0.492) (0.472) (0.186) (0.155) 
2014 -0.175 -0.165 -0.307 -0.220 -0.114 -0.117 
 (0.166) (0.162) (0.348) (0.358) (0.163) (0.160) 
2015 -0.322 -0.222 -0.573 -0.607 -0.322 -0.196 
 (0.196) (0.182) (0.384) (0.409) (0.215) (0.194) 
N 5619 5619 3057 3057 5242 5242 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Supplemental Material (intended for online publication) 
Table 12: OLS results for sample of firms with procurement contracts 
 
Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market Novelties 
(%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PPCI 8.754*** 1.722 7.031*** 
 (2.498) (1.619) (2.194) 
Innovation Intensity 0.453*** 0.175* 0.278*** 
 (0.112) (0.091) (0.096) 
Firm Size 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
High-skilled Employees 0.015 0.001 0.015 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.033) 
Knowledge Stock -0.083 0.033 -0.116* 
 (0.120) (0.071) (0.068) 
Cost Per Capita -2.755 -0.509 -2.246 
 (4.183) (1.714) (3.518) 
Export Share 0.126*** 0.069* 0.058 
 (0.045) (0.036) (0.039) 
Group 2.983 -0.130 3.114* 
 (2.070) (0.757) (1.886) 
Foreign Group -11.182** -1.273 -9.909*** 
 (4.450) (2.314) (3.617) 
East German 1.464 0.457 1.007 
 (1.350) (0.697) (1.223) 
Constant 0.598 -0.183 0.781 
 (1.782) (0.425) (1.657) 
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.159 0.203 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
N = 675. Industry dummies included. 
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Table 13: Covariate balance for nearest-neighbor matching in Table 8 of the main paper 
Variable 
Mean 
Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Err. 
Difference 
P-value 
Difference 
Innovation Intensity 0.670 0.350 0.320 0.202 0.115 
Firm Size 0.245 0.003 0.241 0.251 0.338 
High-skilled Employees 0.525 0.335 0.191 0.142 0.182 
Knowledge Stock 0.362 0.028 0.334 0.253 0.187 
Cost Per Capita -0.170 -0.173 0.003 0.082 0.973 
Export Share 0.437 0.399 0.038 0.179 0.833 
Group 0.169 0.019 0.149 0.149 0.318 
Foreign Group 0.169 -0.003 0.172 0.168 0.309 
East German -0.085 -0.066 -0.019 0.139 0.889 
Industry 1 -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.114 1.000 
Industry 2 -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.114 1.000 
Industry 3 -0.145 -0.145 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Industry 4 0.163 0.099 0.064 0.188 0.735 
Industry 5 0.049 0.049 0.000 0.179 1.000 
Industry 6 -0.009 -0.009 0.000 0.135 1.000 
Industry 7 -0.070 -0.070 0.000 0.119 1.000 
Industry 8 0.350 0.350 0.000 0.189 1.000 
Industry 9 -0.093 -0.018 -0.075 0.126 0.554 
Industry 10 0.099 0.036 0.064 0.167 0.702 
Industry 11 -0.121 -0.121 0.000 0.094 1.000 
Industry 12 -0.134 -0.134 0.000 0.076 1.000 
Industry 13 -0.202 -0.202 0.000 0.060 1.000 
Industry 14 -0.150 -0.150 0.000 0.071 1.000 
Industry 15 -0.062 -0.062 0.000 0.118 1.000 
Industry 16 -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.125 1.000 
Industry 17 0.302 0.302 0.000 0.192 1.000 
Industry 18 -0.086 -0.086 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Industry 19 0.175 0.175 0.000 0.190 1.000 
Industry 20 0.121 0.121 0.000 0.155 1.000 
Industry 21 -0.163 -0.163 0.000 0.092 1.000 
Industry 22 -0.146 -0.146 0.000 0.095 1.000 
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Table 14: Covariate balance for nearest-neighbor matching Table 8 of the main paper when  
exact matching on R&D Grant is requested 
Variable 
Mean 
Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Err. 
Difference 
P-value 
Difference 
Innovation Intensity 0.670 0.260 0.410 0.198 0.040 
Firm Size 0.245 -0.018 0.263 0.251 0.296 
High-skilled Employees 0.525 0.392 0.134 0.145 0.359 
Knowledge Stock 0.362 -0.006 0.367 0.250 0.143 
Cost Per Capita -0.170 -0.139 -0.031 0.084 0.709 
Export Share 0.437 0.332 0.104 0.173 0.548 
Group 0.169 -0.006 0.174 0.148 0.240 
Foreign Group 0.169 0.054 0.114 0.177 0.519 
East German -0.085 -0.046 -0.039 0.139 0.780 
Industry 1 -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.114 1.000 
Industry 2 -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.114 1.000 
Industry 3 -0.145 -0.145 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Industry 4 0.163 0.099 0.064 0.188 0.735 
Industry 5 0.049 0.049 0.000 0.179 1.000 
Industry 6 -0.009 -0.009 0.000 0.135 1.000 
Industry 7 -0.070 -0.028 -0.043 0.126 0.735 
Industry 8 0.350 0.350 0.000 0.189 1.000 
Industry 9 -0.093 -0.055 -0.037 0.121 0.758 
Industry 10 0.099 0.036 0.064 0.167 0.702 
Industry 11 -0.121 -0.121 0.000 0.094 1.000 
Industry 12 -0.134 -0.134 0.000 0.076 1.000 
Industry 13 -0.202 -0.202 0.000 0.060 1.000 
Industry 14 -0.150 -0.150 0.000 0.071 1.000 
Industry 15 -0.062 -0.062 0.000 0.118 1.000 
Industry 16 -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.125 1.000 
Industry 17 0.302 0.302 0.000 0.192 1.000 
Industry 18 -0.086 -0.086 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Industry 19 0.175 0.175 0.000 0.190 1.000 
Industry 20 0.121 0.121 0.000 0.155 1.000 
Industry 21 -0.163 -0.163 0.000 0.092 1.000 
Industry 22 -0.146 -0.146 0.000 0.095 1.000 
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Table 15: 5-nearest-neighbor matching results 
 Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market Novelties 
(%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PPCI 
12.012*** 3.038** 8.973*** 
(2.595) (1.421) (2.386) 
Standard errors according to Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
Specification analogous to matching reported in the main paper (Table 8). 
 
Table 16: IV regression results for sample of firms with procurement contracts 
 
Turn. New Products 
(%) 
Turn. Market Novelties 
(%) 
Turn. Firm Novelties 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PPCI 8.719*** 2.852 5.867** 
 (2.997) (2.318) (2.597) 
Innovation Intensity 0.453*** 0.169* 0.284*** 
 (0.111) (0.093) (0.095) 
Firm Size 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
High-skilled Employees 0.015 -0.001 0.017 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.032) 
Knowledge Stock -0.083 0.026 -0.109 
 (0.117) (0.071) (0.067) 
Cost Per Capita -2.762 -0.278 -2.483 
 (4.101) (1.699) (3.443) 
Export Share 0.126*** 0.068* 0.059 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.038) 
Group 2.985 -0.190 3.175* 
 (2.019) (0.738) (1.834) 
Foreign Group -11.182** -1.268 -9.914*** 
 (4.343) (2.241) (3.517) 
East German 1.463 0.494 0.969 
 (1.316) (0.673) (1.193) 
Constant 0.603 -0.321 0.923 
 (1.747) (0.465) (1.589) 
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.157 0.202 
Cragg-Donald F Statistic 35.783 35.783 35.783 
Hansen’s J Statistic 19.940 26.966 24.220 
P-value Hansen’s J 0.8948 0.5736 0.7180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Instrumented: PPCI. N = 675. Industry dummies included. 
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Table 17: Pseudo-treatment test (pre-treatment period) 
 Turn. New 
Products 
Turn. Market 
Novelties 
Turn. Firm 
Novelties 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public Procurement 
(TED) 
-0.789 -0.955 -0.770 
 (0.503) (0.648) (0.658) 
Innovation Intensity -0.008 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.014) 
Firm Size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
High-skilled Employees -0.007 0.035* -0.019 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) 
Cost Per Capita 0.472 0.476 0.432 
 (0.450) (1.813) (0.454) 
Export Share 0.010 -0.013 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.011) 
2007 -0.056 0.095 -0.066 
 (0.130) (0.233) (0.154) 
2008 0.007 -0.169 0.051 
 (0.164) (0.289) (0.174) 
Treated × 2007 0.089 0.088 0.137 
 (0.422) (0.398) (0.566) 
Treated × 2008 -0.211 -0.383 -0.312 
 (0.462) (0.383) (0.638) 
N 747 399 671 
F test on joint 
significance of Treated 
× (2007 and 2008) (p-
value) 
0.499 0.448 0.352 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
  
 
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, STRATEGY AND INNOVATION 
Naamsestraat 69 bus 3500 
3000 LEUVEN, BELGIË 
tel. + 32 16 32 67 00 
fax + 32 16 32 67 32 
info@econ.kuleuven.be 
www.econ.kuleuven.be/MSI 
